Karen Stilling v. Richard L. Skankey, Dba Olympus Hills Mall, and Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John M. Hammond; dba Thomas, Petersen, Hammond & Associates : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Karen Stilling v. Richard L. Skankey, Dba Olympus
Hills Mall, and Timothy F. Thomas, William F.
Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John M.
Hammond; dba Thomas, Petersen, Hammond &
Associates : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John D. Parken, Marcella L. Keck; Parken and Keck; Attorneys for Appellant.
Mark S. Gustavson; Gustavson, Schultz, Hall and Williams; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stilling v. Skankey, No. 880197.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2142
453 
UTKH s
UPRtW£ 
COURT 
•
s 9
 ^ ^ poctf 
THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo— 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
and 
TIMOTHY F. THOMAS; 
WILLIAM F. THOMAS; 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN; and 
JOHN M. HAMMOND d/b/a 
THOMAS, PETERSEN, 
HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
—oooOooo— 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 880197 
Priority 14(b) 
Appeal from the Order of Dismissal of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
PARKEN & KECK 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark S. Gustavson 
GUSTAVSON, SCHULTZ, HALL & WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
630 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo— 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
and 
TIMOTHY F. THOMAS; 
WILLIAM F. THOMAS; 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN; and 
JOHN M. HAMMOND d/b/a 
THOMAS, PETERSEN, 
HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
—oooOooo— 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Supreme Court No. 880197 
Priority 14(b) 
Appeal from the Order of Dismissal of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
PARKEN & KECK 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark S. Gustavson 
GUSTAVSON, SCHULTZ, HALL & WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
630 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PARTIES 1 
JURISDICTION 1 
RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS 2 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 2 
ISSUES PRESENTED 2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 3 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Architects' Statute of Repose Violates Article I, 
Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah 7 
POINT II 
Even if the Statute of Repose is Constitutional, the 
Dismissal of the Crossclaim for Indemnification was 
Precluded in This Case by Section 78-27-41 . . . . 9 
CONCLUSION 12 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Page 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 6,7 
Horton, et aL, v. Goldminer's Daughter, etal 2 
Authorities Cited 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 11 2,3,6,7,9 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Section 78-12-25.5 . . . 2,3,6,7 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Section 78-27-38 . . . 10 
(in footnote) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Section 78-27-40 . . . 9 
(in footnote) 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Section 78-27-41 . . . 2,3,6,9, 
10,11, 
12,13 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
—000O000— 
KAREN STILLING, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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RICHARD L SKANKEY, d/b/a : 
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL, Priority 14(b) 
Defendant/Appellant. 
and 
TIMOTHY F. THOMAS; 
WILLIAM F. THOMAS; : 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN; and 
JOHN M. HAMMOND d/b/a : 
THOMAS, PETERSEN, 
HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES, : 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
—oooOooo— 
PARTIES 
The parties are fully identified in the caption of the case. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court is authorized by Section 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), to hear this appeal from the District Court 
because the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction under 
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS 
There have been no prior appeals in this action; however, this 
Court is considering the constitutionality of Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), on certification from the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah in Horton, et al, v. Goldminefs Daughter, et 
al., and consolidated actions, in case number 870031. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court dismissing 
with prejudice the Crossclaim of Defendant Skankey against co-Defendants 
Thomas, Peterson and Hammond, d/b/a Thomas Peterson Hammond & 
Associates. The Order of Dismissal from which this appeal is taken contains, 
by its terms, a Rule 54 certification of finality. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. As applied by the District court in this case to Appellant's 
Crossclaim for indemnity, is Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), unconstitutional in that it precludes free access to the court in 
contravention of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution? 
2. In view of the provisions of Section 78-27-41, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), did the trial court err in dismissing 
Appellant's Crossclaim? 
2 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Article I. Section 11. Constitution of Utah: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Section 78-27-41. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended 1986): 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is 
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective proportions 
of fault. 
Section 78-12-25.5. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended):1 
No action to recover damages for any injury to 
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property, nor any action for 
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction or 
construction of such improvement to real property more 
than seven years after the completion of such 
construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, 
corporation, partnership, or any other legal 
entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the 
purposes of this act shall mean the date of 
issuance of a certificate of substantial 
completion by the owner, architect, engineer or 
lrThis section was amended in 1988 with regard to matters not material 
to this appeal. 
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other agents, or the date of the owner's use or 
possession of the improvement on real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall 
not apply to any person in actual possession and control 
as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the 
time the defective and unsafe condition of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the 
injury for which it is proposed to bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as 
extending or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by 
the laws of this state for the bringing of any action. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents Thomas, Peterson and Hammond first moved the lower 
court to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint on the basis of 
Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (R. at 58.) The 
Court granted that motion. (R. at 110.) Plaintiff has taken no appeal from 
the dismissal of her action against Respondents, which was certified as "final" 
pursuant to Rule 54 (R. at 193, reproduced infra at A-22 through A-24). 
Thereafter, Respondents filed a similar motion, seeking the dismissal of 
Appellant's Crossclaim for indemnity. (R. at 139.) That motion was also 
granted (R. at 189) and certified as final (R. at 190, reproduced infra at A-19 
through A-21) by the District Court. Appellant appeals from that dismissal. 
(R. at 196.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the decision under review was pursuant to a Motion to 
Dismiss, the factual allegations of Appellant's Crossclaim are deemed true. 
From those allegations, together with matters as to which the parties have 
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agreed in various Memoranda filed with the lower court, the following facts 
emerge. 
The Plaintiff, an elderly woman, alleges that she was injured on 
December 29, 1986, in the parking lot of the Olympus Hills Mall in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, when she "tripped and fell several feet over a retaining wall." 
(Complaint, R. at 2, at paragraph 5, reproduced infra at A-2 through A-6.) 
Approximately five weeks later, on February 7, 1987, Plaintiff filed suit 
against Defendant (now Appellant) Richard Skankey, alleging that the 
"retaining wall" was dangerous. (Complaint, R. at 2.) In November of 1987, 
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, naming as additional parties defendant 
Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond. (Amended Complaint, R. at 30.) 
Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond were the architects 
and engineers responsible for the planning and design of the construction of 
the Olympus Hills Mall parking lot at the location at which Plaintiff alleges 
she was injured. (Crossclaim, R. at 88, at paragraph 1.) Respondents 
contracted with Appellant to plan and design the parking lot in a safe manner 
and owed a duty to Appellant as well as the public generally to plan and 
design the parking lot in a safe manner. (Crossclaim, R. at 88, at paragraphs 
3 and 4.) In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff similarly alleges that her 
injuries were due to the dangerous condition caused by the negligent failure 
of Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond to design and plan the 
parking lot properly. (Amended Complaint, R. at 30, at paragraph 15.) 
The construction of the parking lot in question was substantially 
completed in November of 1978. 
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Appellant filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and 
crossclaimed against Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and Hammond, alleging 
that if the "retaining wall" was dangerous as Plaintiff alleges, then it was as 
a result of the design created by Respondents Thomas, Peterson, and 
Hammond. (Answer and Crossclaim, R. at 85, reproduced infra at A-13.) 
Appellant sought both indemnification and a determination pursuant to 
Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), of the 
proportionate share of fault attributable to Respondents Thomas, Peterson, 
and Hammond. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. By analogy to the reasoning of this Court's ruling in Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, infra, the statute of repose contained in Section 78-12-25.5, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), is unconstitutional because it 
violates the "open courts" provisions of Article I, Section 11, of the 
Constitution of Utah. Moreover, as demonstrated by the facts of this case, 
application of the statute of repose is unfair because a landowner (such as 
Appellant) who contracts with an architect to design a safe premises, may 
incur liability to an injured person (such as the Plaintiff) but be precluded 
from recovery over against the negligent architect. 
2. The dismissal of Appellant's Crossclaim against the allegedly 
negligent architects was also in contravention of Section 78-27-41, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended 1986). That section is a key part of the Tort 
Reform Act of 1986 and is necessary to effectuate the clearly manifest 
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purpose of rendering each defendant liable only for those injuries attributable 
to his, her, or its own fault. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ARCHITECTS' STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The parking lot now alleged to be dangerous was substantially 
completed in November of 1978. Accordingly, the seven-year statute of 
repose contained in Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), cut off any right of action by Appellant as of November, 1985. 
The Plaintiff does not allege, however, that she was injured until December 
29, 1986. Accordingly, Appellant's cause of action for indemnification against 
the respondent architects for their breach of their agreement and duty to 
design the parking lot in a safe manner was barred by the statute of repose 
before it ever arose. Accordingly, Appellant had no opportunity to pursue his 
cause of action for indemnification. 
In 1985, this Court addressed, in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 
111 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), the constitutionality of the very similar statute of 
repose contained in the Utah Product Liability Act. That statute of repose, 
like the statute of repose at issue in this action, had operated to bar a cause 
of action before that cause of action had even arisen. This Court held that 
the statute of repose was unconstitutional because it violated Article I, 
Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah. In so holding, this Court reasoned: 
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The clear language of the section guarantees access to 
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on 
fairness and equality . . . . A plain reading of 
Section 11 also establishes that the framers of the 
constitution intended that an individual could not be 
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to 
protect basic individual rights. A constitutional 
guarantee of access to the courthouse was not intended 
by the founders to be an empty gesture; individuals are 
also entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for 
injuries to "person, property, or reputation." 
717 P.2d 675. This Court then went on to articulate and apply a two-prong 
test to determine whether the statute of repose was constitutional: Was an 
alternative remedy available and, if not, was abrogation of the cause of 
action by the statute of repose justified by "a clear social or economic evil"? 
(717 P.2d at 680). 
In the present case, as in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, there was no 
meaningful alternative remedy available and, in the present case, just as in 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft, there is no "clear social or economic evil" requiring 
the statute of repose. While architectural standards may have changed 
somewhat since 1978, the Plaintiff, the defendant landowner, and the architect 
all face the same problem of proof. While those problems may be somewhat 
greater for the Plaintiff, who has the burden of proof, they are equal as 
between the defendant landowner and the architect. The cutting off of the 
landowner's right of indemnification against the allegedly negligent architect 
furthers no compelling social policy and eliminates no social or economic 
"evil"; it merely places the defendant landowner in an untenable and 
inequitable legal quagmire. Significantly, the Utah Legislature did not even 
attempt to articulate a perceived public necessity for the abolition of causes 
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of action against architects for injuries occurring more than seven years after 
the completion of their projects. 
The precepts and logic set forth by this Court in its recent 
decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft, supra, compel the same result with 
respect to the virtually identical statute of repose at issue in this action. 
The seven-year architects' statute of repose is unconstitutional under Article 
I, Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah. The lower court's dismissal of the 
Crossclaim for indemnification was, accordingly, erroneous. 
POINT IL EVEN IF THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL, THE DISMISSAL OF THE CROSSCLAIM FOR 
INDEMNIFICATION WAS PRECLUDED IN THIS CASE BY 
SECTION 78-27-41. 
The fundamental premise of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is that 
each defendant is liable only for that proportion of damages attributable to 
the fault of that defendant.2 The concept of comparative negligence has 
been retained in that a plaintiff may recover only from a defendant whose 
2Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), 
provides: 
[T]he maximum amount for which a defendant 
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to 
the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
de fendan t . . . . 
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percentage of fault exceeds that of the plaintiff3, but the damage award is no 
longer calculated by reducing the total damages by the plaintiffs percentage 
of fault. 
Since a plaintiffs judgment against a defendant is now calculated 
as being that defendant's percentage of fault multiplied by the plaintiffs total 
damages, it is necessary that all of the fault from all possible sources be 
compared in one calculation at one time. The Legislature in drafting the Tort 
Reform Act of 1986 recognized that all fault contributing to an injury would 
have to be concurrently analyzed by the jury. Section 78-27-41, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), enables analysis of all fault contributing 
to a given injury by providing that: 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant 
who is a party to the litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective proportions 
of fault. 
The facts of the present claim illustrate the necessity of comparing 
all fault at one time as permitted by Section 78-27-41. Assuming arguendo 
that the "retaining wall" over which the Plaintiff tripped constitutes a 
dangerous condition, fault may lie with the architect (who designed it), the 
3Section 78-27-38, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1986), 
provides: 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his 
own. However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributable to that defendant. 
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landowner (who might have made changes in warnings, railings, or lighting 
conditions) or the injured person (who might have failed to exercise due care 
for her own well being)4. Hypothetically, the finder of fact could determine 
that the architect was 80% responsible, the landowner 15% responsible, and 
the plaintiff 5% responsible. Assuming that the Plaintiffs injuries were 
determined to be $10,000.00, the Plaintiff would recover $8,000.00 from the 
architect and $1,500.00 from the landowner. 
However, the lower court has dismissed the architect from the 
lawsuit. Thus, the jury can compare only the fault of the plaintiff and the 
landowner. Unfortunately, when the jury compares merely the fault of the 
plaintiff and the landowner, but otherwise reaches the same conclusions, the 
jury will allocate 75% of the fault to the landowner and 25% to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff would then recover $7,500.00 from the landowner. Clearly, this 
is not the result intended by the Legislature since it results in a recovery by 
the injured person from the landowner of an amount far in excess of the 
landowner's actual proportionate share of the damages sustained. The 
unintended and anomalous result is the result of the trial court's dismissal of 
the respondent architects in direct violation of the mandate of 
Section 78-27-41. 
It is important to note that the key provision, Section 78-27-41, is 
not phrased in terms of the original parties having the right to litigate the 
fault of non-parties, but clearly in terms of the original parties "joining" (/.&, 
bringing in) additional persons as defendants. This is because of the obvious 
4There is no allegation, in the present case, that the parking lot was 
not constructed in accordance with the architect's specifications. 
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impracticality of the original parties attempting to litigate vicariously the 
position of non-parties.5 
By dismissing the respondent architects in violation of the mandate 
of Section 78-27-41, the trial court has wholly frustrated the fundamental 
precept of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 - that each party should be 
responsible only for his, her, or its own fault. 
CONCLUSION 
The architects' statute of repose, when applied to the facts of this 
case, serves to preclude Appellant's cause of action for indemnification before 
that claim ever arose. Accordingly, particularly in light of this Court's 
decision with respect to the analogous statute of repose found in the Utah 
Product Liability Act, the architects' statute of repose is unconstitutional. 
The lower court erred in dismissing Appellant's Crossclaim for indemnification. 
The fundamental precept of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 is that 
each defendant should be responsible only for that defendant's own fault. 
Accordingly, it is necessary that all of the fault causing a given injury be 
simultaneously analyzed by the jury. In order to allow the necessary 
concurrent analysis of all of the fault leading to an injury, the Legislature 
provided that any party might join as additional defendants any other person 
5For example, if only the injured person and the landowner were to 
attempt to litigate the fault attributable to the architect, the injured person 
would be placed in the wholly anomalous position of having to argue that the 
architect was without fault (/.&, that the condition about which she complains 
was not, in fact, dangerous) and the landowner would have to argue that the 
condition was, in fact, dangerous but was attributable to the architect. Both 
positions are irreconcilably inconsistent with the natural positions of the 
Plaintiff and the landowner in the litigation. 
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"who may have caused or contributed to the injury." The dismissal of 
Appellant's Crossclaim against the architects was directly contrary to Section 
78-27-41 and is erroneous. 
The Order of Dismissal entered by the lower court dismissing 
Appellant's claims against the respondent architects must be reversed and the 
Crossclaim reinstated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W _ day of September, 1988. 
PARKEN & fKECK 
jinsel fo\ Defendant and 
pliant Richard Skankey d/b/a 
pus Hills Mall 
Original signature 
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STATE OF UTAH 
BY/ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
7 / ^ 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
Olympus Hills Mall, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND 
civil N o . ^ p y - / / ^ 
Plaintiff for a cause of action against defendant claims 
and alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff Karen Stilling is a resident of Twin 
Falls, Idaho. 
2. Defendant Richard L. Skankey is a resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah and is registered with the Utah 
Corporations Division as doing business as Olympus Hills Mall. 
A-2 
3. The acts or omissions upon which this action is 
based occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. On the night of December 29, 1986, the plaintiff 
was a business invitee at Olympus Hills Mall. 
5. On December 29, 1986, plaintiff, while walking in 
the northern-most parking lot of Olympus Hills Mall, north of the 
Castletons store, tripped and fell several feet over a retaining 
wall. 
6. As a result of the fall on December 29, 1986, 
plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer severe personal in-
juries, including numerous fractures of her left leg, physical 
and emotional distress. 
7. As a result of the severe personal injuries, plain-
tiff has been required to undergo extensive medical and hospital 
treatment, which treatment is ongoing and continuing. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff reincorporates her allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 7 above. 
8. The following acts of negligence by the defendant 
directly and proximately caused plaintiff's damages as herein al-
leged: 
(a) Failure to warn business invitees of a known 
danger on the land; 
- 2 -
a_o 
(b) Failure to provide railings, barriers or other 
guarding to prevent injury to business invitees; 
(c) Failure to adequately mark, illuminate, or 
otherwise call to the attention of business invitees in the 
parking lot of Olympus Hills Mall the dangerous condition 
of the retaining wall between the parking lot and the roadway 
below; and 
(d) Failure to provide adequate lighting in the 
parking lot to illuminate the dangerous condition of the re-
taining wall after dark. 
9. Defendant owed a duty to use reasonable care to 
protect business invitees, such as the plaintiff, from harm re-
sulting from defective and dangerous conditions on the land and 
the above acts of negligence were a breach of that duty of rea-
sonable care. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff reincorporates her allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 9 above. 
10. Defendant, as owner of Olympus Hills Mall, knew 
of the dangerous conditions presented by the retaining wall north 
of the Castleton's store. 
11. Defendant knew that the retaining wall presented 
a high likelihood of serious bodily injury to business invitees. 
- 3 -
12. Defendant was given actual notice by business 
owners and employees in Olympus Hills Mall that the retaining 
wall in question presented a danger to business invitees without 
proper railing or barriers. 
13. Defendant's action in failing to provide sufficient 
guarding or barriers, railings or warnings of the retaining wall 
when defendant was on actual notice of the dangerous condition 
constitutes wilfull, malicious and/or reckless conduct and dis-
regard for the law and the rights of the plaintiff. 
14. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages as a 
result of defendant's willful and malicious or reckless behavior. 
NOW, WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests a jury trial and 
prays for judgment in her favor and against defendant as follows: 
1. For special damages for the costs of hospital 
and medical care and treatment; 
2. For general damages for pain and suffering, both 
physical and emotional; 
3. For damage for loss of bodily function; 
4. For prejudgment interest as allowed by law; 
5. For punitive damages in an amount determined by 
the trier of fact; and 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems just. 
A-5 
DATED this 
/ 
7 day of F -lary, 1987. 
^ / ^ ^ 
FR3D/£. SILVESTER/," Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Karen Stilling 
Plaintiff's Address: 
113 9 Fifth Avenue, East 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
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FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862) 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Karen Stilling 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
Olympus Hills Mall; TIMOTHY F. 
THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS, 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN AND JOHN 
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS, 
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOC. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND JURY DEMAND 
Civil No. C 87-1156 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Plaintiff for a cause of action against defendant claims 
and alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff Karen Stilling is a resident of Twin 
Falls, Idaho. 
2. Defendant Richard L. Skankey is a resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah and is registered with the Utah 
Corporations Division as doing business as Olympus Hills Mall. 
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3. Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. 
Petersen and John M. Hammond are registered as doing business as 
Thomas Petersen Hammond & Associates ("Thomas Petersen"), which 
has its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
4. The acts or omissions upon which this action is 
based occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. On the night of December 29, 1986, the plaintiff 
was a business invitee at Olympus Hills Mall ("Mall"). 
6. That night, while walking in the northern-most 
parking lot of the Mall, north of the Castletons store, plaintiff 
tripped over a curb and fell several feet to a driveway below. 
7. As a result of the fall, plaintiff has suffered 
and continues to suffer personal injuries, including numerous 
fractures of her right leg and physical and emotional distress. 
8. As a result of the personal injuries, plaintiff 
has been required to undergo medical and hospital treatment, 
which treatment is ongoing and continuing. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as if fully set forth herein. 
10. The following acts of negligence by the defendant 
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Richard Skankey actually and proximately caused plaintiff's 
damages: 
(a) Failure to warn business invitees of a known 
danger on the land; 
(b) Failure to provide railings, barriers or other 
guarding to prevent injury to business invitees; 
(c) Failure to adequately mark, illuminate, or 
otherwise call to the attention of business invitees in the 
parking lot of Olympus Hills Mall the dangerous condition 
of the curb between the parking lot and the driveway below; 
and 
(d) Failure to provide adequate lighting in the 
parking lot to illuminate the dangerous condition of the re-
taining wall after dark. 
11. Defendant Richard Skankey owed a duty to business 
invitees, such as the plaintiff, to use reasonable care to prevent 
harm resulting from defective and dangerous conditions on his 
land and the above acts of negligence were a breach of that duty 
of reasonable care. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for damage as set forth 
below. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 
through 11 above as if fully set forth herein. 
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13. Thomas Petersen designed and planned the addition/ 
remodel in which the parking lot northeast of the Castleton's 
store was constructed. 
14. In designing and planning the addition/remodel 
for the parking lot, Thomas Petersen failed to include adequate 
barriers, railings or other protections to prevent falls such 
as that suffered by the plaintiff. 
15. As a direct and proximate cause of Thomas 
Petersen's breach of its duty to use reasonable care in designing 
and planning the parking lot, plaintiff suffered severe personal 
injuries and has been required to undergo medical and hospital 
treatment, which treatment is ongoing and continuing. 
NOW, WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests a jury trial and 
prays for judgment in her favor and against defendants as follows: 
1. On plaintiff's First Cause of Action for judgment 
against Richard Skankey dba Olympus Hills Mall for special dam-
ages for the costs of hospital, medical and nursing care and 
treatment; lost past and future wages and other expenses neces-
sarily incurred by the plaintiff as a result of her injuries; 
and general damages for pain and suffering, both physical and 
emotional; damages for loss of bodily function; and for such 
other and further relief as the Court deem just and equitable 
under the circumstances. 
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2. On plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for judgment 
against Thomas Petersen for special damages for the costs of 
hospital, medical and nursing care and treatment; lost past and 
future wages and other expenses necessarily incurred by the plain-
tiff as a result of her injuries; and general damages for pain 
and suffering, both physical and emotional; damages for loss of 
bodily function; and for such other and further relief as the 
Court deem just and equitable under the circumstances. 
DATED t h i s d a y o f SggvSeay&e?, 1987 
-FiffiD R. SILVESTER, E s q . 
CHARLES P . SAMPSON, E s q . 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Karen Stilling 
Plaintiff's Address: 
113 9 Fifth Avenue, East 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing Amended Complaint and Jury Demand 
to be mailed, postage prepaid thereon, this '_ day of 
1987, to: 
John D. Parken, Esq. 
Marcella L. Keck 
PARKEN & KECK 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Boston Building, Suite #808 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CS14.19 
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^ccti JJc&dLuucl^ John D. Parken (2518) 
MarceUa L. Keck (4063) 
PARKEN & KECK 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Richard L. Skankey, d/b/a 
Olympus Hills Mall 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 596-2920 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
4^ IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
32**b 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
Olympus Hills Mall; TIMOTHY 
F. THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS, 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN and JOHN 
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS, 
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOC 
-oooOooo— 
ANSWER TO AMENDED 
COMPLAINT and CROSS-CLAIM 
Civil No. C87-1156 
The Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat 
Defendant. 
-oooOooo-
Defendant Richard L. Skankey, by and through his counsel, John D. 
Parken, hereby answers Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Responding to the specific allegations of Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint, this Defendant admits, denies, and alleges as follows: 
1. This Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to 
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
2. This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 2 and 3 
of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
3. In response to the allegations of paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, this Defendant admits that Plaintiffs allegations are 
alleged to have occurred in Salt Lake County. 
4. This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5 of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
5. In response to the allegations of paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, this Defendant admits that Plaintiff alleges that she 
tripped, but denies that she fell several feet. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
7. In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, 
this Defendant incorporates by reference to Paragraphs 1 through 6 above. 
8. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in its entirety. 
9. In response to the allegations of paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, this Defendant admits that he owed a duty to the public, 
alleges that he fully and faithfully complied with that duty, and denies any 
negligence or other breach of any duty. 
10. In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, 
this Defendant incorporates by reference to paragraphs 1 through 9 above. 
11. This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 13 of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
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12. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 14 of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. However, Defendant affirmatively alleges that 
in the event the trier of fact finds any inadequacy in the parking lot as 
alleged by Plaintiff, Defendants, Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, 
Stephen G. Petersen and John M. Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond 
& Assoc, are responsible as alleged below. 
13. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15 of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
14. Except to the extent admitted or qualified in the foregoing 
responses, this Defendant denies each and every material allegation of 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The damages and injuries of which Plaintiff complains, if any were 
caused and contributed to by Plaintiffs own carelessness, inattention, and 
fault, which was equal to or greater than that, if any of this Defendant. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The damages and injuries of which Plaintiff complains, if any were 
caused and contributed to by the negligence and fault of other persona and 
entities over whom this Defendant neither exercised nor possessed control or 
the right of control and any liability of this Defendant should be limited to 
the pro rata share of the fault attributed to him. 
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FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages and seeks an amount 
greatly and grossly in excess of her actual damages, if any. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has received, or was entitled to receive, certain first-party 
insurance benefits, the amount of which must be deducted from any recovery 
that Plaintiff might otherwise be entitled to receive against this Defendant. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs action against this Defendant is barred and precluded by 
the applicable statute of limitations and/or statue or repose, including, 
without limitation, Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Richard L. Skankey respectfully demands 
that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be dismissed, no cause of action, and that 
Plaintiff take nothing thereby but that this Defendant be awarded his costs of 
court, counsel fees, and such other and further relief as this Court may deem 
just and equitable under the circumstances and applicable law. 
CROSS-CLAIM 
Defendant, Richard L. Skankey cross-claims against Defendants 
Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen and John M. 
Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond & Assoc, (hereinafter "Thomas 
Petersen") alleging as follows: 
1. Defendants Thomas Petersen were the architects and engineers 
responsible for the planning and design of the construction of the Olympus 
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Hills Mall parking lot at the location at which Plaintiff alleges she was 
injured. 
2. Defendants Thomas Petersen contracted with this Defendant to 
plan and design a safe premises. 
3. Defendants Thomas Petersen owe a duty to the public 
generally to plan and design a safe premises. 
4. Plaintiff has brought this action for negligence against this 
Defendant and against Defendants Thomas Petersen for the allegedly unsafe 
parking lot. 
5. This Defendant denies both that he was negligent and that the 
premises is unsafe but asserts that should it be determined that the premises 
at issue are in any way inadequate, then the inadequacy results from the 
negligence of Defendants Thomas Petersen and alleges that the fault lies with 
Defendants Thomas Petersen. 
6. Should judgment be entered against this Defendant, this 
Defendant is entitled to full and complete indemnification from Defendants 
Thomas Petersen. 
7. Pursuant to Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) the fault of Defendants Thomas Petersen should be determined. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Richard L. Skankey respectfully demands 
judgment of indemnification against Defendants Thomas Petersen with respect 
to any liability adjudged against it in this action, together with any costs, 
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expenses, counsel fees, or losses incurred by this Defendant and such other 
and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable. 
DATED this ttA day of February, 1988. 
yrney tor Defendant 
rd L. Skankey 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / c/~~~ day of February, 1988, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Cross-Claim to be mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Fred R. Silvester 
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson 
175 South West Temple Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mark Gustavson 
630 East South Temple Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
"7 s — /y^/^A^ 
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Mark S. Gustavson, (1278) 
Charles A. Schultz, (4760) 
GUSTAVSON, HALL & WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
630 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 533-8361 
RLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lakp. ?>:•.-«*" ' Hah 
APR 2LS 1988 
H. Dixon H!ndl9y,£ierk 3fd Oist. Coun /  uerx .yd uist. Cou 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL; TIMOTHY F. 
THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS, 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN and JOHN 
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS, 
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND 
) FINAL JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C87-1156 
i (Judge: Richard H. Moffat) 
Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. 
Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and 
Associates, Motion to Dismiss Co-Defendants1 Richard L. Skankey, 
d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall Cross-claim, came on for regularly 
scheduled hearing before the Honorable Judge Richard H. Moffat, on 
April 8, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. The Court, having 
reviewed the file in this matter, having read and reviewed the 
memoranda filed by the respective parties to this action, having 
heard and considered the oral arguments of counsel, and now being 
fully advised as to the relevant facts and the applicable law, 
hereby grants Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, 
Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, 
Hammond and Associates, Motion to Dismiss Co-Defendants1 Richard 
L. Skankey, d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall Cross-claim with prejudice. 
Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
this, and acting upon the request of parties to this action, this 
Court herein certifies this Order of Dismissal to be Final 
Judgment, finding there to be no reason for delay of an entry of a 
Final Judgment upon the Motion of Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, 
William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a 
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and Associates, to Dismiss the Cross-
claim of Richard L. Skankey, d/b/a Olympus Hills Mall. 
Dated this ^XS day of April, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLEPK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herebv certify that on the IC/ day of April, 1988, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order of 
Dismissal and Final Judgment to the persons at the addresses 
listed below by depositing a copy in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid. 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
No. 9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fred R. Silvester 
Charles P. Sampson 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
700 Learning Clark Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Mark SZ—&&stavson 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Defendants 
Timothy F. Thomas, 
William F. Thomas, 
Stephen G. Petersen, and 
John Hammond, d/b/a 
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond 
and Associates 
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Gai iLr -o 
Mark S. Gustavson, (1278) 
Charles A. Schultz, (4760) 
GUSTAVSON, HALL & WILLIAMS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
630 East South Temple 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 533-8361 
MAYS 1S39 
H. Dixon Knujey, £ V K orp Dist. Coun 
go . 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN STILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD L. SKANKEY, d/b/a 
OLYMPUS HILLS MALL; TIMOTHY F. 
THOMAS, WILLIAM F. THOMAS, 
STEPHEN G. PETERSEN and JOHN 
M. HAMMOND, d/b/a THOMAS, 
PETERSEN, HAMMOND & ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
1 AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C87-1156 
I (Judge: Richard H. Moffat) 
Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomasf Stephen G. 
Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomasf Petersen, Hammond and 
Associates, Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Karen Stilling, 
came on for regularly scheduled hearing before the Honorable Judge 
Richard H. Moffat, on February 19, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
All parties were represented at the hearing by their respective 
counsel of record. 
The Court, having reviewed the file in this matter, having 
read and reviewed the memoranda filed by the respective parties to 
this action, having heard and considered the oral arguments of 
counsel, and now being fully advised as to the relevant facts and 
the applicable law, hereby grants Defendants' Timothy F. Thomas, 
William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a 
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and Associates, Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff Karen Stilling1s Complaint, as against Defendants 
Timothy F. Thomas, William F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and 
John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, Petersen, Hammond and Associates with 
prejudice. 
Pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
acting upon the request of parties to this action, this Court 
herein certifies this Order of Dismissal to be Final Judgment, 
finding there to be no reason for delay of an entry of a Final 
Judgment upon the Motion of Defendants1 Timothy F. Thomas, William 
F. Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, 
Petersen, Hammond and Associates, to Dismiss the Complaint of 
Karen Stilling as to Defendants Timothy F. Thomas, William F. 
Thomas, Stephen G. Petersen, and John Hammond, d/b/a Thomas, 
Petersen, Hammond and Associates. 
Dated this <=</ day of April, 1988, 
BY THE COURT: 
RIC 
DISTRICT 
ATTEST 
H. DIXCM HINDLEY 
CLERK 
Sy ^^lah^cUL 
*puty Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the $6h day of April, 1988, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Amended 
Order of Dismissal and Final Judgment to the persons at the 
addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid. 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
Suite 808 Boston Building 
No. 9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fred R. Silvester 
Charles P. Sampson 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
S. Gustavson 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Defendants 
Timothy F. Thomas, 
William F. Thomas, 
Stephen G. Petersen, and 
John Hammond, d/b/a 
Thomas, Petersen, Hammond 
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